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Wife v. Husband, In
Maryland, After Vance v.
Vance
by Linda Lee Panlilio
For centuries at common law a wife could not sue her
husband for any reason. This tradition is based on
theories of inter-spousal tort immunity, including merger
of the legal existence of wife into husband by marriage
and public policy regarding preservation of the family.
Furstenberg v. Furstenberg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534
(1927). This was true even where the cause of action was
based on events occurring prior to the marriage in Maryland and most other jurisdictions, Barton v. Barton,
32 Md. 214, 224 (1870); Farage, Recovery for Torts
Between Spouses, 10 IND. L.J. 290, 292-94 (1934).
Inter-spousal tort immunity was also upheld because of
the strong possibility of collusion in the filing of spurious
claims, especially in regard to insurance recoveries, influenced by the close relationship between husband and
wife. Adequate alternative remedies were felt to be available through criminal and divorce courts. 8 U. BALT. L.
REV. 584, with numerous citations, at 587(1979). Eventually, enactment of the Married Womens' Property Acts,
such as Maryland Annotated Code, Art. 45 §5 (1971 and
Supp. 1978), established a separate legal identity for
married women. However the Acts were generally found
to establish rights to sue third parties, not husbands. This
interpretation was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910), and was
almost universally recognized until recently. 8 U. BALT. L.
REV.,

supra at 589.

The general rule was abrogated in Maryland in 1978,
by Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978),
when it was held that there was nothing under the common law of Maryland to indicate that a wife was not
permitted to recover from her husband in tort when she
alleged and proved his outrageous conduct towards her.
Outrageous conduct was the Lusby criteria for a narrow
exception to the immunity.
Prior to Lusby it had been found that the right of a wife
to sue must be conferred by statute, Gregg v. Gregg, 199
Md. 662, 87 A.2d 581 (1951); Ennis v. Donovan, 222
Md. 536, 161 A.2d 698 (1959); that the Married
Womans Property Act put the wife on the same footing as
the husband with respect to her personal and property
rights, Kromm v. Kromm 31 Md. App. 635, 358 A.2d
247 (1976); that the statute (M.W.P.A.) must be strictly
construed as granting a wife the right of a femme sole to
sue and be sued, Furstenberg v. Furstenberg, 152 Md.
247, 136 A. 534 (1927); Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214
Md. 519, 135 A.2d 886 (1957); to sue in her own name

for torts committed against her before or after the Act was
effective, Wolf v. Frank, 92 Md. 138, 48 A. 132 (1900); to
purchase and become liable in property transactions,
Whitely v. Whitely, 117 Md. 538, 84 A.68 (1912); to sue
in her own name for protection of her property, Masterman v. Masterman, 129 Md. 167, 97 A. 537 (1916);
Cochrane v. Cochrane, 137 Md. 530, 115 A. 811
(1921); Furstenberg, supra; to sue for torts committed
against her and on her contracts, Hudson v. Hudson. 226
Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961); that no additional right to
sue husband was conferred, only the right to sue alone,
independently from the husband, Hudson, supra,
Fernandez, surpa, Furstenberg, supra; that wife could
contract with husband and sue against him, limited to
actions on contracts between them, Gregg; supra, 13
MD. L. REV. 253 (1953); and that either husband or wife
could sue the other in equity regarding protection of
property, Blumenthal v. Monumental Security Storage,
Inc., 271 Md. 298, 316 A.2d 243 (1974); Jones v.
Jones, 259 Md. 336, 270 A.2d 126 (1970); Fernandez
supra; Cochrane v. Cochrane, 139 Md. 530, 115 A.
811 (1921); Smith v. Smith, 211 Md. 366, 127 A.2d
374 (1956).
Thus it evolved that a married woman may sue her
husband, Masterman, supra, Cochrane, supra; Furstenberg, supra; but not for a personal tort, Furstenberg,supra; Fernandez, supra; Ennis, supra; Hudson, supra,
David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932).
Where a wrongful act was committed by the man
against the woman prior to their marriage, and when the
women could have sued the man for that act, marriage
extinguished the cause of action, Hudson, supra. A wife
could not sue husband for injuries sustained in auto accident in Maryland; Mountjoy v. Mountjoy, -Md.-,
206 A.2d 733 (D.C. App. 1965), although under North
Carolina law a Maryland wife could sue husband for
such tort, La Chance v. Service Trucking Company,
215 F. Supp. 162 (D.C. Md. 1963); nor could a wife recover for negligent torts even if the parties were separated with an executed separation agreement, Asch v.
Asch, 11 Md. App. 395, 274 A.2d 646 (1971).
There is no statute similar to the Married Woman's
Property Act, nor any case law whereby a husband may
sue his wife except in contract as noted in Gregg,supra. A
suit by husband seeking to have wife enjoined from
assaulting husband, taking his personal property, damaging his personal or real property, and restrained from
trespassing was dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action for which relief could be granted, in Sarkissian v.
Sarkissian, 35 Md. App. 445, 360 A.2d 453 (1976).
Finally, in Lusby, supra, it was found that a wife could
indeed sue the husband in tort for outrageous acts against
her. The Lusbys were living separate and apart, pursuant
to filing for divorce. Mr. Lusby raped his wife and assisted
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two friends in their attempt to do likewise. Under Maryland law a husband is immune from prosecution for rape
of his wife, Maryland Annotated Code, Art. 27, §464D
(1976). However, when Mrs. Lusby brought charges
against all three for rape, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional injuries the
Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to hear the
case. The Court ruled that in Maryland interspousal tort
immunity was abrogated in cases involving outrageous,
intentional torts, thereby modifying the common law
doctrine, 8 U. BALT. L. REV., supra, at 584, 585.
However, the modification was narrowly drawn to apply only to outrageous, intentional torts. The court did not
relate its decision to any statutory construction.
The Lusby decision of 1978 has been followed by a
December, 1979, decision allowing recovery from a husband by the wife for a negligent tort. Vance v. Vance, Md.-, 408 A.2d 728 (1979); affirming in part, overruling in part 41 Md. App. 130, 396 A.2d 296 (1979). In
Vance the wife was awarded a verdict for negligent misrepresentation which resulted in actionable emotional
distress. The court found a right to recovery for emotional distress resulting in physical injury under Bowman
v. Williams, 169 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933), even
though here the distress was caused by the husband.
In Vance the emotional distress resulted from the husband's revealing to the wife that their marriage of 20
years was a nullity since the divorce decree from his prior
marriage had not become final until after he had been
married to the plaintiff-wife for more than a month.
A husband being sued may argue that Vance does not
further abrogate inter-spousal immunity sufficiently to
allow the case of action because the Vance marriage
was void. However the Maryland Court of Special Appeals refers to the bigamous Vance union as a "marriage" throughout its analysis and discussion of Vance
divorce proceedings. The Maryland Court of Appeals
sidesteps the issue by referring to the parties as Dr.
Vance and Muriel respectively throughout. Neither case
actually addresses the issue in light of the inter-spousal
immunities, however a plain reading of Lusby followed
by Vance would extend sufficient cause of action to a
similarly wronged wife. For general discussion regarding
this issue see 79 HARV. L. REV. 1650 (1966) and see 8
U. BALT. L. REV. 584, 596 (1979) for specific discussion
regarding such logical extension to abrogation of intraspousal tort suits in negligence at 594. For articles on
void and voidable marriages in Maryland see 22 MD L.
REV. 211 (1958) and 13 MD. L. REV. 128 (1933)

Try, Try Again (It's your
constitutional right)
by Lu Clark
Just in time for the nail-biting, coffee-soaked expedition into bar exam study period comes this cheery bit of
news from the federal district court in Colorado: it violates due process and perhaps equal protection for a limit
to be placed on the number of times an applicant can
take the bar exam.
While agreeing that the exam is a valid measure of
professional competence (something that has also been
challenged lately), the plaintiff asserts that the number of
times the test is taken before a passing score is achieved is
irrelevant. Additional legal study, exposure to law-related
work, or even individual changes in maturity and personal development may affect one's ability to comprehend and articulate legal principles.
Application of a rule that effectively places a final limitation on the number of examinations an individual may
take appears to be based upon an assumption that a
given individual will never become competent, says
Younger of Younger v. Colorado State Board of Bar
Examiners, reported in 48 USLW 2518 (1980). It could
also be considered to create an irrebuttable presumption
of incompetence of the type that has been found to be
constitutionally infirm. The court rejected evidence that
no fifth-time examinees have ever passed and held that
by eliminating any opportunity for reexamination, the
rule has no rational connection with the compelling interest in requiring a demonstration of professional competence and is therefore unconstitutional.

